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As national economies become increasingly knowledge-based, the education sector is 
witnessing an evolution of its goals and methods. The European Commission’s Lisbon 
Strategy, initially vaguely aimed at making the European Union’s economy more dynamic 
and competitive when it was first laid out at the March 2000 Lisbon Summit, was redefined 
in Spring 2005 and now revolves around the concepts of growth and jobs. The Commission 
recommends investment in the knowledge economy by investing in R&D, innovation, and 
education and lifelong learning. As Bulgaria has the lowest GDP per capita of all the EU-27 
MS, an examination of its current situation regarding the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy can serve as an example of the problems facing the poorer countries of the EU. 
Problems may not be as obvious or pressing in the richer Member States, but may be more 
so in the poorer Member States. 
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As the world slowly evolves into a post-industrial economy and national 
economies become increasingly knowledge-based, patterns of training and 
employment are also evolving. Life-long employment within one company, a 
characteristic of much of the industrial employment structures, is becoming a 
rarity. As companies downsize and contract out employment, they are 
increasingly seeking pre-trained individuals who do not need as much on-the-
job training. This limits costs and provides the flexible employment contracts 
companies see as important in a fast-paced and continuously evolving world. 
 
This evolution has implications for the education sector. As modern 
economies become increasingly reliant on technology to meet all forms of day-
to-day operations, educational institutions are witnessing an evolution of their 
goals and methods. Employers increasingly rely on academic institutions to 
meet the technology training needs of students at all stages of teaching. The 
cost of creating an infrastructure that meets the needs of this type of 
technology-based education means that the availability of government and 
private funding can draw the line between the best and the worst performing 
educational institutions. 
 
The European Commission’s (COM) Lisbon Strategy, initially vaguely aimed 
at making the European Union (EU) economy more dynamic and competitive 
when it was first laid out at the March 2000 Lisbon Summit, was redefined in 
Spring 2005 and now revolves around the concepts of growth and jobs. 
Amongst the microeconomic reforms Member States (MS) should undertake, 
the Commission recommends investment in the knowledge economy by 
investing in R&D, innovation, education and lifelong learning.1 This requires 
investment and concerted government policy, which in turn require a stable 
government with a long-term vision, and an attractive investment climate. 
The GDP of the different Member States is vastly different between the lowest 
and the highest levels. Eurostat, measures EU GDP per capita according to 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), a ‘common currency’ to objectively 
measure GDP by eliminating different price levels. The average is set at 100, 
which means that any country falling above has a higher than average GDP, 
and vice versa for countries falling below 100. To indicate the widely varying 
GDP levels, for 2008 Luxembourg has the highest GDP per capita at 252.8, 
whilst Bulgaria has the lowest at 40.1.2
 
 This is a very significant problem that 
plays a central role in the ability of different MS to implement the Lisbon 
Strategy, due to its role in terms of funds available for government policies. 
                                                 
1 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Spring European 
Council – Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (2008-2010) including a Commission 
Recommendation on the Broad Guidelines for the Economic Policies of the Member States 
and the Community (under Article 99 of the EC Treaty) and a Proposal for a Council Decision 
on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States (under Article 128 of the EC 
Treaty)’, COM(2007) 803 final PART V, Brussels, 11 December 2007, p. 13. 
2 Eurostat, GDP per capita in PPS - GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) 
(EU-27 = 100), available at: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&
pcode=tsieb010>. 
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As Bulgaria has the lowest GDP per capita of all the EU-27 MS, an 
examination of its current situation regarding the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy can serve as an example of the problems facing the poorer 
countries of the EU. Problems that may not be (immediately) apparent in the 
MS with higher GDPs may become more pressing in those with lower GDPs 
per capita. In addition to the lowest EU-27 GDP per capita, Bulgaria has also 
had a very difficult post-communist experience. Governance and leadership 
problems, linked to corruption and instability, coupled with hyper inflation in 
the mid-1990s, means that the country has a more difficult environment in 
which to implement strong policy changes, and has difficulty attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) because of institutional and financial 
uncertainty. As the educational component of the Lisbon Strategy relies 
heavily on investment levels in education as well as a clear purpose and 
understanding of the changes needed in national educational structures, this 
paper will present Bulgaria’s situation in regards to the Lisbon Strategy’s 
knowledge economy goals. 
 
Post-Industrialism and the Knowledge Economy 
 
The Lisbon Strategy was created in March 2000, at the time of the Dot-Com 
Bubble.  This period was characterised by a high growth in internet-based 
companies and technologies, and was seen as a revolution in the way business 
would be conducted.3 Speculation led to the collapse of this bubble in 2001, 
but the concept of a Knowledge Economy had entered mainstream discourse,4 
and the European Commission embarked on a course aimed at making the EU 
economy ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010’.5
 
 This 
section will present the concepts of knowledge economy and post-
industrialism so as to create the framework for analysing the purpose of the 
Lisbon Strategy and the problems Bulgaria faces in its implementation as 
regards the education sector. 
Post-industrialism is best understood as an evolution of industrialism rather 
than a separate theory. Industrialism as understood in the West is closely tied 
to capitalist economy theory. Stearns defines transition as an evolution in the 
way of working, as well as the way of thinking – a new framework for society.6
 
 
In this sense, post-industrialism is not a different framework but an evolution 
within the framework.  
Knowledge is considered a central component of post-industrialism, 
characterised by what Chardin has termed the ‘noosphere’ – the product of 
                                                 
3 D. Howcroft, ‘After the Goldrush: Deconstructing the Myths of the Dot.Com Market’, 
Journal of Information Technology, No. 16, 2001, pp. 195–204. 
4 M. Taylor, and A. Murphy, ‘SMEs and E-business’, Journal of Small Business and 
Enterprise Development, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, pp. 280-289. 
5 European Parliament, Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 – Presidency 
Conclusions’, Paragraph 6, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm>. 
6 P.N. Stearns and D. Bell. ‘Is There a Post-Industrial Society?’, Society, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1974, p. 
17. 
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‘people communicating on a global scale.’ This communication at the global 
level is the result of technological advances that have created the ‘capacity to 
work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale.’ 7 This has been achieved as 
computing power has increased and become more affordable.8 It is also what 
Bell terms ‘the systematic development of research and the creation of new 
science-based industries.’9 Huber argues that the amount, growth and 
significance of knowledge have increased.10
 
 This knowledge is also 
increasingly stored in ‘extra-genetic records,’ as tacit knowledge becomes 
transcribed through technological advances. The introduction of knowledge 
transcribed in various forms in all sectors of the economy means that 
previously low-skilled work now requires information retrieval skills, 
previously principally a characteristic of medium- and highly-skilled work. 
Knowledge has become a commodity, replacing the dominant commodities of 
industrial economies, which relied predominantly on raw materials. 
Knowledge is an intangible asset, it is not a scarce good, and is non-rival (i.e. 
cannot be destroyed in consumption),11 and there is virtually zero marginal 
cost for every additional user.12
 
 Knowledge differs from information in that it 
is the value added to information. As individuals acquire the skills to 
transform information into knowledge, they increase the pool of knowledge 
and increase the value of the information. It is important to distinguish 
knowledge as a commodity from the tertiary sector of an economy, commonly 
associated with the services. Technology derived from the knowledge economy 
is applied across the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, and is thus not 
strictly limited to the services.  
While the democratisation of education may have been a step in creating a 
more equal society, the necessities of the post-industrial economy mean that 
education is no longer a question of democratic access per se but rather a 
question of economic necessity linked to the commodification of education. 
The development of capitalism led to the ‘old’ middle class of farmers, artisans 
and independent professionals’ being replaced by the ‘emerging ‘new’ middle 
class of managers, technical employees, [and] white-collar workers […].’13 As 
Serge Mallet argues in his Mallet Thesis, the break-down and specialisation of 
work means that this middle class is still subjected to the principles of 
Fordism.14 Herbert Gintis defined this as the ‘educated labour.’15
                                                 
7 D. Ronfeldt, and J. Arquilla, ‘From Cyberspace to the Noosphere: Emergence of the Global 
Mind’, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2000, p. 18. 
 The post-
industrial economy is thus not a project of democratisation of knowledge, but 
of commodification of knowledge. 
8 I. Brinkley, Defining the Knowledge Economy: Knowledge Economy Program Report, 
London: The Work Foundation, July 2006, p. 13. 
9 D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York: 
Basic Books, 1973, p. 196. 
10 G.P. Huber, ‘The Nature and Design of Post-Industrial Organisations’, Management 
Science, Vol. 30, No. 8, 1984, p. 932. 
11 J. Houghton, and P. Sheehan, ‘A Primer on the Knowledge Economy’, CSES Working Paper, 
No. 18, 2000, p. 13. 
12 T. Clarke, ‘The Knowledge Economy’, Education + Training, Vol. 43, Nos. 4-5, 2001, p. 190. 
13 Bell, op. cit., p. 59. 
14 Mallet, quoted in Bell, op. cit., pp. 149-150. 
15 Bell, op. cit., p. 151. 
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The digital divide (the differential between those who have acquired the 
information retrieval skills of the post-industrial economy and those who have 
not) is a question of integration of workers into the post-industrial economy, 
not one of democratic access to knowledge. Esping-Andersen points out 
though that ‘life-long opportunities and environment affect a person’s ability 
to accumulate these skills.’16
 
 Societal differences are thus created by the lack 
of access to training in post-industrial skills, but the purpose of these skills is 
not the general goal of an equal society, but a society where all are capable of 
contributing to economic growth through the application of these skills. 
Human capital and its improvement thus become central goals in the context 
of post-industrialism. 
While post-industrialism is a theorisation of a general evolution within the 
framework of industrialism, the Knowledge Economy is a specification of the 
concept of knowledge within post-industrialism. It is a theorisation of the role 
for, and policies surrounding, knowledge workers. It thus includes discourses 
from economics, management theory, futurology, and sociology.17
 
 As was 
explained in the context of post-industrialism, knowledge is a commodity, and 
thus there is a strong push for the term knowledge ‘economy’ rather than 
knowledge ‘society.’ 
The knowledge economy and knowledge workers are characterised by ‘flexible 
production technology, a disintegration of corporate hierarchies into 
networks, and an increasing importance of economic networks – instead of 
firms – as loci of economic activities.’18 Universities and research institutions 
are becoming increasingly important loci of activity in the processing of 
information for the creation of knowledge. Preparing individuals for this 
environment creates new responsibilities for childhood learning. As the 
knowledge economy may require ‘soft’ skills in addition to highly-skilled 
knowledge of technological applications, such as leadership, teamwork, 
lifelong learning, and communication and analytical skills, all within the 
context of technological applications in work environments,19
 
 there are strong 
implications for national education policy goals. 
The Lisbon Strategy - Education 
 
As Soete points out, technological changes in information and communication 
technologies (ICT) have led to structural changes in the economic, social, and 
organisational framework of society. These include: ‘the dramatic reduction in 
the costs of information and communication processing; […] the 
                                                 
16 G. Esping-Andersen, ‘Towards the Good Society, Once Again?’ in G. Esping-Andersen, et al 
(eds.), Why We Need a Welfare State, Oxford: OUP, 2002, p. 3. 
17 M. Peters, ‘National Education Policy Constructions of the ‘Knowledge Economy’: Towards 
a Critique’, Journal of Educational Inquiry, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2001, p. 4. 
18 M. Benner, ‘The Scandinavian Challenge: The Future of Advanced Welfare States in the 
Knowledge Economy’, Acta Sociologica, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2003, pp. 135-136. 
19 L. Soete, ‘The Challenges and the Potential of the Knowledge-Based Economy in a 
Globalised World’ in M.J. Rodrigues (ed.), New Knowledge Economy in Europe. A Strategy 
for International Competitiveness and Social Cohesion, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2002, p. 38. 
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technologically-driven ‘digital convergence’ between communication and 
computer technology; and […] the rapid growth in international electronic 
networking.20 Despite this, data from 1995 indicates that knowledge 
investment as a percentage of GDP in the EU-15 was lower than in the USA 
and Japan, and physical investment between that of the USA (low) and Japan 
(high). Data from 1997 indicates that ICT expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
still remained lower than in the USA and Japan. 21
 
 What this appears to 
indicate is that the Dot-Com Bubble served as a turning point in the minds of 
EU policy-makers, indicating the need to invest more in knowledge, and 
especially ICT (which can be considered to have a knock-on effect due to its 
integration in different sectors of the economy), thus culminating in the 
Lisbon Strategy.  
The Dot-Com Bubble burst after the creation of the Lisbon Strategy, and the 
program did not take off as had been hoped. In 2005, the European Council 
renewed the Lisbon Strategy, focussing it more on growth and jobs. This 
growth should be sustainable, and the focus on employment aimed at creating 
jobs in the EU, which had been the victim of consistently high unemployment. 
Data shows that unemployment as a percentage of labour force in the EU22  
has hovered between 7.2 and 9.3 since 2001, whilst it was as low as 4.0 in the 
1971-1980 period.23
 
 As this data excludes eight of the newest MS, which as a 
general trend are amongst the poorest of the EU MS, this data may even hide 
higher numbers. 
The aim of the renewed Lisbon Strategy is to speed of the pace of reform, thus 
‘helping Member States to implement sometimes difficult but necessary 
change to address the challenges […].’24
 
 The guidelines outlines by the 
Commission include both macro-economic, micro-economic, and employment 
guidelines. Training and education falls within the parameter of micro-
economic and employment guidelines, which include: 
‘To increase and improve investment in R&D, in particular by private 
business.’ 
‘To facilitate the spread and effective use of ICT and build a fully inclusive 
information society.’ 
‘Expand and improve investment in human capital.’ 




                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 29. 
21 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
22 This measure only reflects those included in the labour force, omitting those that are not 
noted as willing and able to take up employment. It means that they may be because they have 
dropped out of the labour market for one reason or another, but may wish to return to 
employment but feel unable to for one reason or another. This means unemployment levels 
may in reality be higher than official data suggests. Additionally, the data excludes 11 of the 
EU MS. 
23 European Central Bank, ‘Population and the Labour Market in the Euro Area’, Statistical 
Data Warehouse, <http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=100000244>.  
24 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Spring European 
Council, op. cit., p. 3. 
25 Ibid., p. 6. 
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It is suggested that the public sector promote the efficient allocation of 
resources to promote growth and employment without compromising 
economic stability and sustainability. Investment in R&D, human capital, and 
knowledge are described as falling within this category.26 It is stated that 
‘[k]nowledge accumulated through investment in R&D, innovation, education 
and lifelong learning, is a key driver of long-run growth.27 The interaction of 
these different elements is the key, as their effect on growth, if considered in 
isolation, would be minimal. The Commission thus recommends that higher 
education, research and business cooperate.28 As a central concept, growth 
indicates the same framework as was present within industrialism, with the 
new components of the Knowledge Economy now being targeted. Also, 
employment and growth are linked, which means that methods for getting 
individuals into employment are also connected to human capital investment. 
Education and skills play a role in this context, as teaching people the 
information retrieval and soft skills necessary to be successful in the 
Knowledge Economy will allow fuller participation within it. Lifelong learning 
is cited as a policy that needs to be encouraged as well, due to the continuously 
evolving technological changes and work patterns that require flexibility and 
new skills on the part of individuals. Both the Structural Funds and the 
European Investment Bank are available as sources of investment in 
education and training in the MS. 29
 
 
Other policy recommendations include increasing inclusion in all levels of 
education and training policies, significantly reducing the number of early 
school leavers, and creating efficient lifelong learning strategies. Affordability, 
accessibility, and official intra-European recognition are important 
components in achieving these goals.30
 
 
Applying the Principles of the Knowledge Economy to the 
Education Sector in Bulgaria 
 
Carnevale and Desrochers point out that ‘[…] the initial stock of education in 
individual nations determines growth potential in the new information 
economy. Countries whose populations have high levels of education are 
fertile soil for information-based technology.’31
 
 
This means that countries beginning at a disadvantage may end up lagging 
behind without ever being able to fill the gap.  
 
Butera identifies the ‘ancient traditions’ of Western and Eastern Europe in the 
relationship between theory and practice in Europe as an important hurdle in 
the development of universities capable of assuming the tasks set before them 
in the Knowledge Economy. Additionally, they operate in both a global 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
27 Ibid., p. 13. 
28 Ibid., p. 15. 
29 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
30 Ibid., p. 32. 
31 A.P. Carnevale, and D.M. Desrochers, ‘The Missing Middle: Aligning Education and the 
Knowledge Economy’, The Journal for Vocational Special Needs Education, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
Fall 2002, p. 3. 
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economy as well as in a differentiated cultural and social local setting.32
 
 
Butera identifies the key elements of world-class universities as follows: 
 the ability to generate new knowledge and breakthrough innovations; 
 the ability to store, renew, and share knowledge; 
 the ability to ‘provide services to fit the changing needs of emerging 
lifelong education’; 
 the ability to train knowledge workers. 
 
Butera also identifies the need to work in cooperation with private business, 
government, other institutions, and the community,33 to create the 
partnerships needed to achieve the criteria of a world-class university. He also 
points out that the goals, resources, and institutional setting need to be 
rethought to achieve these goals in a knowledge economy.34
 
 
Nikolov argues that the EU as a whole suffers from ‘under-investment in 
human capital, especially in higher education.’ The problem of brain-drain of 
highly qualified researchers to the USA, and the general insufficient number 
of science and technology graduates (though higher than in the USA), and by 
extension significantly fewer researchers working in the EU, are identified as 
serious problems.35 As regards the new MS, Nikolov points to the problem of 
‘brain-waste’ (when a highly qualified individual works in a low-qualified job), 
brain drain, loss of human capital (Bulgaria has lost approximately one 
million citizens to emigration), and internal brain drain (‘domestic ‘drain’ of 
intellectuals out of academia and science and into other occupations 
altogether’). Nikolov points out that low salaries are not the sole problem 
facing the new MS. Problems of investment in infrastructure (including 
libraries and equipment), as well as a lack of intellectual environments 
allowing an exchange of ideas and knowledge, and experienced managers to 
head research teams and apply for funding, are also problems facing the new 
MS. He recommends focussing on brain gain and brain circulation to improve 
the educational environment. This would also help build human capital, as it 
would lay the base for future learning. 36
 
 
In terms of the question of lifelong learning, Dimitrova points out that there 
are national policies and actions in adult vocational training aimed at 
providing education and skills to allow individuals to adapt to new skill 
requirements or re-enter the workforce.37
                                                 
32 F. Butera, ‘Adapting the Pattern of University Organisation to the Needs of the Knowledge 
Economy’, European Journal of Education, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, p. 403. 
 Dimitrova argues that productivity 
levels have not kept pace with other EU MS due to insufficient participation of 
the labour force and points out that participation in lifelong learning in 
Bulgaria is very far from the 2010 target of the Lisbon Strategy (in 2005, 1.3% 
of the population participated in lifelong learning, while the Lisbon goal is 
33 Ibid., p. 404. 
34 Ibid., p. 405. 
35 R. Nikolov, ‘From eLearning to eUniversity’, International Conference on Computer 
Systems and Technologies – CompSysTech’08, p. 5. 
36 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
37 E. Dimitrova, ‘Challenges and Perspectives of the Adult Vocational Training System in 
Bulgaria’, European Journal of Vocational Training, Vol. 41, No.  2, 2007, p. 30. 
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12.5%). As economic growth in the Knowledge Economy requires a highly-
skilled and flexible workforce,38 this is a serious discrepancy with important 
ramifications. Another problem is that corporate investment in training is not 
common practice, largely due to the fact that the majority of employers are 
small companies that do not have the funds available to invest in training, or 
an understanding of the role formal training plays in improving productivity. 
Employers are also afraid of investing in their employees, who may then leave 
to another employer and take the investment with them. This is compounded 
by a lack of understanding of employment contract clauses to prevent this.39
 
 
At the national level, Bulgaria also faces the problem of having had to 
reconstruct its vocational training system following the collapse of 
communism, which coupled with the economic and political difficulties of the 
transition period, has prevented it from advancing at the pace required.40 The 
training of unemployed individuals has proven to be quite successful, as the 
training offered is aligned with labour force demand and data from 2005 
indicates that 73.8% of individuals found employment following training.41 
Additional problems include the physical location of most training centres, 
based essentially in Sofia, Plovdiv and Varna – the largest cities.42 Though this 
is logical in terms of population numbers, it risks creating a two-tier structure 
that may further reinforce educational and employment differentials between 
the cities and the rural areas. In addition to the government facilities, private 
providers have entered the market. Problems of qualification, consistency and 
infrastructure have appeared as a consequence.43 Dimitrova recommends 
improving the links between education, training, and the labour market, 
which reiterates a problem already highlighted and points to its central 
importance at all levels of education and research.44
 
 
Zarifis also points to the question of lifelong learning in the context of the 
Lisbon Strategy. He highlights research that identifies local learning centres as 
being central in delivering the needs of the individual and the community, 
with knock-on effects in terms of opportunities and further education.45
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 31. 
 As 
illustrated in Dimitrova’s research, the location of educational centres risks 
creating a two-tier structure; Zarifis’ recommendation regarding local centres 
may be a way of avoiding this, though funding would likely be an issue, as 
would connections to other centres. It may be interesting to investigate the 
role of large-scale universities and other research institutions in smaller towns 
across North America and Western Europe to understand whether this has 
had an impact on local learning and access, or serves a minority elite 
population and the local service economy. Zarifis also points to the lowest EU 
39 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
40 Ibid., p. 33. 
41 Ibid., p.. 36. 
42 Ibid., p. 38. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p. 40. 
45 G.K. Zarifis, ‘‘Bringing Learning Closer to Home:’ The Value and Impact of the Lisbon 
Strategy for Strengthening the Role of Local Learning Centres and Partnerships in South-
Eastern Europe’, International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol. 27, No. 6 November-
December 2008, p. 642. 
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lifelong learning participation rate amongst people aged 25-64 in Bulgaria.46
 
 
As Dimitrova pointed out, this presents an impediment to economic growth, 
and achieving the targets of the Lisbon Strategy. 
Writing in 2006, Sgurev and Yusupov highlight the problem of the ten 
national Bulgarian programs related to innovation that do not focus on 
education, science, and ICT, as is advanced by the Lisbon Strategy.47 Further 
research should indicate what approach is being adopted by the new 
government of 2009. In addition to this, they argue that private investment is 
too low as compared to the level of public investment, and that this hampers 
innovation.48
 
 As public expenses are a matter of Commission attention in 
terms of joining the euro zone by achieving stability and low public debt, the 
Bulgarian government may find it worthwhile to investigate this option to fill 
the gap. Though private universities, such as the American University in 
Bulgaria and New Bulgarian University exist, as do several educational 
establishments from nursery to secondary school, it would be of interest to 
investigate levels of private investment in large institutions, such as Sofia 
University. 
Nikolov and Ilieva point to the importance of the ‘knowledge triangle,’ which 
includes education, research and innovation.49 This again indicates the 
importance given to better ties between educational institutions, the other 
public and private players, and outcomes. In addition to new partnerships in 
education, other problems facing institutions include: an increased demand 
for education; the internationalisation of education and research; and the 
proliferation of places where knowledge is produced.50
 
 These are all problems 
that Bulgaria may have difficulty facing, as its resources are smaller than other 
EU MS with better developed educational investment facilities (both public 
and private), it has suffered from a general and applied brain drain, and 
private business is more lucrative than research and academia and thus does 
not encourage individuals to stay on. All of these elements combined can lead 
to serious innovation problems and the ability to meet the goals of the Lisbon 
Strategy. 
Bourdeau-Lepage and Kolarova argue that the challenge facing Bulgaria is 
that it does not have a developed framework for the export of high value-
added business services, and that it thus risks ‘technological 
marginalisation.’51
                                                 
46 Ibid., p. 643. 
 This is related to the innovation potential of the country, 
which in turn is related to Nikolov and Ilieva’s ‘knowledge triangle.’ They also 
argue that human capital alone is not sufficient to achieve the goals of the 
Knowledge Economy: social capital is also required, in the form of 
47 V. Sgurev, and R. Yusupov, ‘The Innovation Potential in Bulgaria: State-of-the-Art and 
Problems’, Problems of Engineering, Cybernetics and Robotics – Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, No. 57, 2006, p. 109. 
48 Ibid., p. 110. 
49 R. Nikolov, and S. Ilieva, ‘Building a Research University Ecosystem: The Case of Software 
Engineering Education at Sofia University’, ESEC/FSE’07, 3-7 September 2007, p. 491. 
50 Ibid., p. 493. 
51 L. Bourdeau-Lepage, and D. Kolarova. ‘Knowledge Society and Transition Economies: The 
Bulgarian Challenge’, Romanian Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 2008, p. 
55. 
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institutional context and the character of governance. Social capital is ‘the 
collective dimension of all rules and norms, of the spontaneous social 
interactions permitting the coordination of actions and the cooperation within 
groups or between them, in order to reach social cohesion and the pursuit of 
common goals.’52 As applied to Bulgaria, the corruption and governance 
problems are certainly impediments to the creation of social capital. 
Combined with what Bourdeau-Lepage and Kolarova term ‘uncertain human 
capital,’ due to relatively high duration of schooling but a low adult literacy 
rate indicating low quality levels in education, potential for innovation and 
growth is likely low. Brain drain also ensures that a large number of the more 
highly-educated individuals move abroad for better conditions. 53 They also 
point to the low investment in ICT, in the form of telephone and computer 
use, and internet access.54 When combined, low levels of investment in 
necessary Knowledge Economy infrastructure, the generally low quality of 
education, and the poor governance and institutional structure, mean that the 
capacity to implement the recommendations of the Lisbon Strategy are very 
much hindered. The potential for this to turn around may exist, as before the 
regime change and the economic and organisational problems that ensued, 
Bulgaria specialised, amongst other industrial branches, in high technologies 
in the form of generation mainframes, high-speed matrix processors and 
parallel systems, software development, system hardware, and digital and 
analogue PC design areas. The tradition of computer-science education, 
engineering and mathematics was strong.55
 
 Perhaps this relatively recent past 
could serve as a model or a reminder of the country’s potential. 
In its evaluation of MS progress in implementing the Lisbon Strategy 
Structural Reforms in 2008, the Commission highlights the continuing 
problem of weak and inefficient government structures, compounded by 
corruption that continues to affect the business environment and access to, 
and quality of, services. Public sector reforms appear rather arbitrary. The 
analysis, conceptual development and enforcement of policies remains weak, 
and ‘[p]olitical recognition of the need to speed up reforms as part of the 
Lisbon Strategy is fairly recent.’ Problems also remain in terms of adult 
participation in training and R&D performance.56 The Commission 
recommends shifting public support to R&D to ‘more competitive funding 
focussed on key priorities.’ Little has been done in terms of ICT penetration, a 
problem highlighted by the researchers presented here.57
                                                 
52 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
 Significantly, the 
Commission also points out that Bulgaria’s educational performance has been 
declining, and that despite measures taken in terms of quality assurance 
mechanisms, general performance evaluations, decentralisation of school 
financing and its linking to performance, and the differentiated pay for 
53 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
54 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
55 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
56 European Commission, ‘Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy Structural Reforms in the 
Context of the European Economic Recovery Plan: Annual Country Assessments – A Detailed 
Overview of Progress Made with the Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy Reforms in 
Member States in 2008’, available at: 
<http://www.lex.unict.it/eurolabor/en/documentation/com/2009/com(2009)_en.pdf>, pp. 
9-10.  
57 Ibid., p. 12. 
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teachers in addition to teacher training, additional measures need to be taken 
in curricula changes to meet labour market needs and the completion of the 
Bulgarian lifelong learning strategy.58
 
 
Conclusion: Past Potential but a Waning Present  
 
Bulgaria’s past success in areas of technological innovation and educational 
achievements indicates that the human capital potential existed, and could 
almost certainly be regained. The problems facing the social capital of the 
country – whether a result or cause of the economic, political, and 
institutional instability of the post-communist years – plays a detrimental role 
in the context of achieving the goals of the Lisbon Strategy. Investment in 
knowledge is low across the EU, but Bulgaria is a particularly acute example of 
the problem of knowledge investment. As the MS with the lowest GPD of the 
EU, and a contender for joining the euro zone, the availability of public funds 
is low. This, in addition to the promotion of closer ties between business, 
education, and the community, indicates the potential of private investment. 
On the other hand, private investment has to contend with an unstable 
institutional environment, where national policies are not necessarily focussed 
on the priorities of the knowledge economy. Though business parks have been 
built, and private institutions do exist, these do not in and of themselves 
respond to the problems highlighted in this research. The promotion of closer 
ties and sound institutional models are also important. Quality and 
consistency must be ensured, which is a difficult matter for a country that is 
still undergoing institutional changes and both realigning its priorities with 
the Lisbon Strategy while trying to meet the needs of its population. This 
research shows that the Lisbon Strategy is an important but expensive 
realignment of priorities in national policies. The capacity of a country such as 
Bulgaria to meet the goals of the Lisbon Strategy and not fall further behind 
will certainly play a determining role in the future place of the country in the 
EU. 
                                                 
58 Ibid., p. 13. 
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A Shifting Sphere? EU engagement with Kazakhstan 
and what this implies for Russian engagement and 
influence in Central Asia.   
 




In the 19th century, Great Britain and Russia were key competitors for 
territory, resources and influence in Central Asia and Greater Persia. The 
Great Game (as it was dubbed by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim), ceased to 
be of consequence after the destruction wrought by the two World Wars. 
Britain being solely concerned with its domestic rebuilding and the crumbling 
of its empire whilst the emergent USSR superpower gained the territories of 
Central Asia, signifying what appeared to be the end of conflict over Central 
Asia. History however, has a way of repeating itself and with the fall of 
Communism and a renewed Western interest in the region following 9/11, 
Central Asia is once again a key geopolitical concern for the major powers. 
Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states, struggling with their new-
found statehood find themselves at the centre of key strategic interests for 
major powers such as China, Russia, the EU and US. These powers, despite 
having clear alignment of interests in regards to countering the spread of 
extremism North from Afghanistan as well as countering the associated drug 
trade, have much less incentive for widespread co-operation in regards to 
energy and its associated geopolitical considerations.  
 
Having been a key republic within the USSR, Kazakhstan’s infrastructure, 
economy and military were inextricably tied within the Soviet framework, 
especially to Russia and in conjunction with its vast oil reserves and joint 
memberships of organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), continues to occupy a central component of 
Russia’s ‘Near Abroad’ interests and strategy.59
                                                 
59 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation,’ Moscow, 2008, available at: <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osnddeng>.     
 With the major powers having 
potentially adversarial interests in relation to Kazakh oil, influence becomes a 
key component in being able to determine the level to which such interests can 
be realised. Maximising influence then becomes in part about mitigating the 
influence of other actors. The EU, having a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of 
over 4 times greater than Russia in 2008 has numerous reasons for involving 
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itself in the Central Asian region and Kazakhstan in particular.60
 
 In regards to 
energy, the interests of the EU do not complement Russian ambitions giving 
rise to behaviour designed in part to maximise influence and minimise that of 
the adversary. Therefore by determining the extent to which the EU has 
formed such a base of soft power in Kazakhstan gives some indication as to 
the level to which Russian influence has diminished within what is 
traditionally considered its core sphere of influence.  
What this article seeks to demonstrate is that despite increased competition 
amongst the powers for access to and the ability to route Kazakh oil, there has 
not been a marked decline in Russian influence in the country. This will be 
demonstrated in two parts. Firstly, by demonstrating that in the post-Soviet 
era, Kazakhstan remains inextricably intertwined with its neighbour Russia 
thereby perpetuating Moscow’s influence over Astana. Secondly, will be an 
illustration of how despite growing economic linkages and diplomatic 
overtures between the EU and Kazakhstan, political differences have 
mitigated these gains. After such considerations of the influence that Brussels 
and Moscow can bring to bear, the article will show that Russian influence has 
not been substantially reduced by the evolution of EU involvement in 
Kazakhstan. It is an important note to make at the outset that the involvement 
of China in the region is gaining markedly for many of the same reasons that 
the West finds itself in Central Asia and may indeed pose a greater threat to 
Russian influence in the country and region as a whole. The focus being on the 
European Union however, it is beyond the scope of this essay to do such a 




On the 16th December 1991, Kazakhstan became the last former republic of the 
USSR to proclaim independence, with Nursultan Nazarbayev adopting the 
presidency of the fledgling country.61 The new republic is bordered by six 
countries including Uzbekistan, China and Russia and finds itself in a difficult 
position due to its geography, being a landlocked country and therefore 
dependent on its neighbours to gain access to international markets. 
Stemming from the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, two-thirds of 
Kazakhstan’s population speak Russian with the language also being used as 
the lingua franca of business in the country despite marked success in the 
promotion of Kazakh as the official language of the state.62 Similarly the 
population demographics show that the more industrialised North of the 
country – that bordering Russia – still maintains a predominantly Russian 
population, whilst the ethnic Kazakhs are more numerous in the poorer, 
lower-wage South.63
                                                 
60 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, ‘Gross Domestic Product, 2008 
PPP’, available at: 
 Even more importantly, until recently Kazakhs did not 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf>. 
61 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook: Kazakhstan’, available at:  
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>.  
62 B. Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's foreign policy towards the CIS 
countries, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 175.  
63 M. Brill Olcott, ‘Kazakhstan’ in M. Mesbahi (ed.), Central Asia and the Caucasus after the 
Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
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constitute a majority within their own republic, in 2005 only just reaching 
53% of the population compared to a 30% Russian population.64 The shift 
towards a more Kazakh make-up of the population has accelerated since then, 
with Nazarbayev quoting figures from the 2009 census in a speech to a joint 
sitting of the 4th parliament that ‘...(t)he share of ethnic Kazakhs has grown 
from 53 to 65% for the decade…’65
 
 For our purposes these demographics and 
their changes are important for understanding the level of soft power or 
influence that Russia can bring to bear.  
The pro-Kazakh policies of the government have been a major factor in the 
decline in the numbers of the ethnic Russian population as they emigrate to 
the Russian Federation.66  The promotion of Kazakh as the titular culture did 
spark concern amongst some political elites in the Russian Federation, but 
with no serious conflict within the country the Russian government has been 
careful not to make this an acrimonious issue. Indeed, as time has passed, this 
issue to become much less important to bilateral relations.67 With a still 
substantial ethnic Russian population however, and the Ivanov Doctrine 
articulating the possible use of force to protect Russian minorities in the CIS, 
Astana must still take the ethnic composition of the country into serious 
account.68 The Russian decision to invade Georgia to protect Russian citizens 
living in South Ossetia provides an important precedent that must also add to 
calculations made by Nazarbayev’s regime.69
 
 Although the significant Russian 
population establishes Russian influence in Kazakhstan, the more effective 
means by which Russia exerts influence in Kazakhstan is through the 
economic realities that have evolved from past Soviet practices.  
The USSR system of infrastructural development led to the Soviet states 
having a high level of entanglement and interdependence between their 
economies. As a consequence of such practices, Kazakhstan and Russia have 
economies that are highly integrated, this being especially the case in terms of 
infrastructure, the military-industrial complex and energy transportation 
networks such as pipelines.70
                                                                                                                                            
1994, p.119; World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and 
Central Asia Region, ‘Kazakhstan: Dimensions of Poverty in Kazakhstan, Volume II: Profile of 
Living Standards in Kazakhstan in 2002,’ Almaty, 2004, available at:  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKAZAKHSTAN/Resources/Poverty_Assessment_V
ol2.pdf>, pp.11-12.   
 The essential nature of the Russian economy to 
Kazakhstan is exceedingly apparent when it’s noted that 90% of Kazakhstan’s 
64M. Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2002, p.174.  
65 N. Nazarbayev, ‘Kazakhstans Parliament Opens its 3rd Session,’ Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, available at: <http://en.government.kz/site/news/092009.01>. 
66 Y. Rasumov, ‘Central Asian Governments Impose Migration Barriers,’ EurAsiaNet.org, 
available at: <http://www.eurasiane.org/departments/insight/articles/eav102401a.html>. 
67 V. V. Naumkin, ‘Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan’ in R. Legvold (ed.), Thinking 
Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus, Cambridge, MA: 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, pp.48-50.  
68 D. Trifonov, ‘Ivanov Doctrine Reflects Moscow’s Growing Confidence in the CIS and 
beyond,’ Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, available at: 
<http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/1657>.  
69 BBC News, ‘Russian Tanks Enter South Ossetia,’ August 8, 2008, available at:  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7548715.stm>. 
70 Olcott, Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise, op. cit., p.129. 
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trade within the CIS is with Russia.71 For instance, Kazakh resources needed 
for the functioning of civilian nuclear reactors are exported to Russia. 
Furthermore, as a continuation from past Soviet policy, the major buyer of 
Kazakh military-industrial products is Russia, whilst the Kazakh military 
obtains Russian arms and armaments at preferential prices from Russia.72
 
 
These all show the high level of interconnectedness that is involved in the 
Russian and Kazakh economies and the prime position that Russia's economy 
occupies.  
When such interconnectedness is examined in relation to the oil industry it 
becomes apparent that Russia has the capacity to wield a significant amount 
of influence in the current political and economic climates. The Kazakh oil 
deposits are primarily found in Kazakhstan's territory in the Caspian Sea and 
Western areas of the country and include the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil 
fields, both at present capable of producing at 280,000bbl/d and 
270,000bbl/d respectively.73 Sharing an expansive border with Russia to its 
North and West and lack of direct access to the open sea gives Kazakhstan 
much fewer options than other oil-exporting countries. As mentioned earlier, 
Soviet policy was to supply the USSR as a single economic bloc, and as such, 
the Kazakh oil that had been developed prior to independence was done so in 
a manner that favoured the exportation of the resources to other areas of the 
Soviet Union via pipelines through Russian territory. Additionally, Russia 
itself is highly dependent on its oil and gas reserves to fund its development. 
Indeed, ‘(a)ccording to IMF and World Bank estimates, the oil and gas sector 
generated more than 60 percent of Russia’s export revenues (64% in 2007) 
and accounted for 30 percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
country.74 As such, Moscow has strong motives to ensure that not only do oil 
prices remain high but also that Russia maintains a position as a key exporter, 
even to the detriment of other countries.75
 
 Such motivations have led to highly 
competitive behaviour that has to some extent undermined the level of 
profitability that Kazakh’s oil industry could have enjoyed.  
As Russia controls a great majority of the pipelines through which Kazakhstan 
can export its oil to international markets, the Russian Federation is in a 
strong position to be able to determine the proportions in which Russian and 
Kazakh oil are sold, this having been the case during the oil price downturn in 
the mid to late 1990s.76
                                                 
71 R. Legvold, ‘Great Power Stakes in Central Asia’ in R. Legvold (ed.), Thinking Strategically: 
The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus, Cambridge, MA: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, p. 21. 
 Concurrently, as these pipelines travel via Russian 
territory, Russia is able to charge transit and tanking fees which enable 
72 Ibid. 
73United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, ‘Country Analysis Briefs: 
Kazakhstan’, available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/Oil.html>. 
74 United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, ‘Country Analysis Briefs: 
Russia’, available at: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/Background.html>. 
75 S. Zhukov and O. Reznikova, ‘Economic Ties between Russia and Kazakhstan: Dynamics, 
Tendencies and Prospects’ in Boris Rumer (ed.), Central Asia at the end of the Transition, 
New York: M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 2005, p. 423.  
76 R. Kandiyoti, ‘What price access to the open seas? The geopolitics of oil and gas 
transmission from the Trans-Caspian Republics’, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 
2008, p.79. 
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Moscow to ostensibly price Kazakh oil out of the market or interrupt flows if 
they felt necessary to do so.  
 
There are few real alternatives to the pipelines travelling through Russian 
territory for the Kazakh government. The two exceptions being Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline travelling through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, as well as 
a pipeline from Atasu in Western Kazakhstan to Alanshakou in Western China 
with a capacity of up to 100 million tons.77 What could otherwise also be a 
viable alternative in transit through Iran is not a possibility because of the 
continuing sanctioning and isolation of the country by the US and a desire by 
Astana to not alienate the US.78
 
 During the oil price collapse, Kazakhstan did 
actually engage in oil swaps with Iran despite U.S. protests, allowing Kazakh 
oil to be sold on international markets. Such practices could lead one to argue 
that the Kazakh regime is not overly concerned with U.S. wishes as other 
states may be and that such spells a precedent for further Kazakh-Iranian 
cooperation. However, Kazakh-U.S. relations are much closer than previously 
and as such the costs for disregarding the strong wishes of the U.S. 
government are that much greater. When this is taken in combination with a 
greater military, economic and political U.S. presence in Central Asia, further 
transit agreements between Kazakhstan and Iran without the U.S.’s explicit 
agreement seems remote at best.   
As such, Russia can take advantage of these political circumstances and use 
these pricing mechanisms and infrastructure of as significant political levers 
against other countries, including Kazakhstan. Indeed, past incidents 
illustrate the willingness of Moscow to use energy as a means of coercion 
against other countries. Firstly, there have been temporary cessation or 
reduction of gas supplies to Ukraine (and by extension Europe) in 2006 and 
2007 following price and payment disputes.79 Secondly, there was a 
disruption of crude oil supplies to Belarus – a close Russian ally, akin to 




These countries find themselves similarly in the thrall of Russia in regards to 
energy supplies. A good indicator of the level of influence that Russia has over 
Kazakhstan in this respect is evident through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
(CPC). Running through not only Kazakh but also Russian territory it enables 
Russia to charge high transit fees for Kazakh oil. Additionally the CPC is 
managed by the state-owned Russian Company Transneft, thereby allowing 
the Russian government inordinate control over the sale of Kazakh oil as well 
as significant profits.81
                                                 
77 I. Bobokulov, ‘Central Asia: is there an alternative to regional integration?’, Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 25, No. 1, March-June 2006, p. 82.  
  
78 Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, op. cit., p. 153.   
79 Thomson Reuters, ‘Timeline: Gas crises between Russia and Ukraine’, January 11, 2009, 
available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Oil/idUSTRE50A1A720090111>.  
80 S. Lee Myer,, ‘Some European oil faces disruption as Russia flow via Belarus is stopped’, 
New York Times, (New York), January 9 2007, available at: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-
belarus.4141945.html>. 
81Kandiyoti, op. cit., p.79.  
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When these abilities of the Russian government are examined in conjunction 
with the constant high-level political engagement both bilaterally and through 
multilateral institutions as well as military co-operation – especially in terms 
of military hardware - entails that Russia, despite its internal difficulties, is 
still in a position to exercise significant influence over Kazakhstan. Let us now 
contrast this with that of the EU.  
 
EU relations with Kazakhstan 
 
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and the rest of Central 
Asia were far from occupying a priority position in either the states of Europe 
or the United States. Even with the fall of Communism, Central Asia failed to 
resonate within the policy-circles in the West. The members of the EU turned 
their attention to their immediate neighbours in Eastern Europe and the 
successor state of the USSR, the Russian Federation. The unique and prime 
position that Russia occupies with the EU is shown through the conducting 
separate policies such as the ‘Four Common Spaces’ as opposed to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which is part of EU engagement with 
other non-EU members in Europe. Indeed, many EU governments, including 
Germany and France have been careful to not damage relations with Moscow 
over EU engagement in its traditional sphere of influence.82 Despite this 
dearth of focus on the newly emerging states in Central Asia, there did arise 
some marked concern with Kazakhstan in regards to its inheriting a vast 
number of Soviet nuclear weapons. Diplomatic initiatives from the US allowed 
for the relinquishing of the weapons and their nuclear components and 
fostered the establishment of political ties between the US and Kazakhstan 
however, by and large these activities were muted in contrast to US and EU 
engagement in other areas.83
 
 
This lack of attention to Central Asia has shifted however, since the events of 
9/11. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, on the Southern border of 
Central Asia and a rise in prominence of the threats of instability that could 
spread throughout the region, fostered by their porous borders, created a 
much greater focus on the region by Western governments. The granting of 
over-flight rights by many countries, including Kazakhstan and Russia as well 
as basing facilities for NATO forces in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
promoted political and military engagement with the countries of the region in 
common cause against the threats posed by extremists and political 
instability.84
                                                 
82 A. Warkotsch, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Bad Neighbourhoods: 
The Case of Central Asia’, European Foreign Affairs Review Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, p.519. 
 It should be noted here that as the EU is made up of sovereign 
states largely unwilling to give up matters such as foreign affairs and defence 
to the body, there are significant limits as to the level of substantive, concerted 
political engagement that the EU can direct to Kazakhstan due to divergent 
83 P. Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, New York: 
Random House, 2008, p. 69.  
84 J. Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, 
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib93108.pdf>.   
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interests between member-states.85 The EU’s methods of engagement with not 
only Kazakhstan but with Central Asia as a region are largely linked in with 
transition towards market economy status as well as the adoption of 
normative principles such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.86 
Inherent in this has been greater economic links with the West for countries 
who progress towards such norms as well as the allure of EU membership for 
Eastern European countries. Such approaches however, have run into 
significant obstacle in regions outside Europe. Central Asia remains outside 
the realms of potential EU membership, and as such one of the key attractions 
for adopting EU principles and so forth is missing from EU engagement with 
Kazakhstan. Indeed, programmes for furthering democratic reforms and the 
like are largely pushed through organisations not directly relating to the EU 
despite having similar memberships, such as the OSCE.87 As such, methods of 
achieving these goals are often ad-hoc and ineffective because of the absence 
of significant benefits that Nazarbayev’s regime would accrue from a 
substantive move towards protection of human rights and democratic norms. 
Indeed, criticisms levelled against the incumbent regime by the OSCE 
regarding a slide towards authoritarianism  has not led to reforms and can 
only be seen to have drawn harsh criticism from Nazarbayev.88
                                                 
85 Workotsch, op.  cit., pp. 518-519. 
 One could 
argue that the economic opportunities presented by the EU would be of great 
significance to Kazakhstan’s development that it would encourage a greater 
move towards democratic norms, thus being especially the case in light of the 
member states’ ever increasing need for secure access to energy resources 
such as oil. By having its companies operating in what is projected to be one of 
the greatest oil-exporting countries in the next decade is of great significance 
to the EU itself as well as its member-states. Having viable alternatives to 
Russian suppliers such as Transneft and Gazprom is of great value to the 
European Union as a whole and to individual countries such as Germany. The 
issue here is despite the opportunities there continue to be major problems in 
making them viable alternatives to minimise dependence. The infrastructure, 
routes almost always favour Russians interests and as the member 
governments do not have controlling or substantial stakes in the private 
European companies currently operating in Kazakhstan  to exert pressure 
through these private businesses they lack the same influence as Russia can 
through its state-owned/controlled enterprises. This is not to say that the EU 
cannot exert any influence into these issues. By allowing Kazakhstan viable 
alternatives to Russian companies in terms of development and financing 
contributes towards a slight reduction in Russian abilities to influence the 
Kazakh government. In addition, aside from private interest in Kazakh 
oilfields, the EU itself must be given credit for fostering greater regional 
economic integration and facilitating more of a European presence in both 
Central Asia as a whole and Kazakhstan through programmes such as 
86C. Williams, ‘EU-Central Asia Relations and the New World Order’ in P. Anderson and G. 
Wiessala (eds.), The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations New York: 
Rodopi, 2007. 
87 N. MacFarlane, ‘European Strategy toward Kazakhstan’ in R. Legvold (ed.), Thinking 
Strategically, Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2003, p. 155.   
88 V- Y. Ghebali, ‘OSCE Regional Policy in Central Asia: Rationale and Limits’ in F. Sabahi and 
D. Warner (eds.), The OSCE and The Multiple Challenges of Transition: The Caucasus and 
Central Asia,’ Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004, pp.  9-10.  
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TRACECA and INOGATE which both primarily revolve around infrastructure 
and economic integration projects – including energy – on a regional scale.89 
EU assistance to Kazakhstan directly amounts €94.2 million whilst regionally 
from 2007 till 2013 €719 million has been earmarked for regional programs.90
 
 
These significant amounts of EU-sponsored aid and development however, do 
not compensate for the problems that arise from the push for democratic 
reforms which Nazarbayev is unwilling to make. As mentioned before the 
OSCE's condemnation of Kazakhstan’s 2001 local elections and its note of a 
slide towards authoritarianism do not ingratiate the European community 
with the regime, especially when regional powers China and Russia have no 
qualms about the lack of democratic institutions in the country.91 As such, the 
extent to which the EU’s influence as a normative power is checked, severely 
limiting the level of political influence it can wield in the country. 
Economically, programmes such as TRACECA which concentrate on 
infrastructure are not as influential as the cash flows from China or the high-
profile American delegations and military presence in the region. In regards to 
Chinese assistance for instance, in the midst of the current financial crisis, 
China has given $US10 billion to Kazakhstan to support it against a marked 
depreciation in the Tenge’s value.92 The withdrawal of such vast monetary 
sums or the public suspension of high-level dialogue would be potentially 
more damaging for the regime.93 As such, it is these countries which have 
more visible presences in the country that have a greater base of soft power 
available. Compounding these problems is the Russian securing of a treaty for 
the construction of the Bourgas-Alexandriopoulous pipeline across the 
Caspian Sea with the Russian energy giants holding the majority stake.94
 
 By 
doing so, Russia has effectively hijacked efforts to move away from pipelines 
traversing Russian territory to a situation in which a substantial pipeline 
designed to circumvent Russian territory is now in fact in large part owned 
and controlled by the Russian energy giants and therefore by extension the 
major shareholder, the Russian government. 
What this shows is that EU efforts to promote its influence in an increasingly 
strategic area of the world, although managing to do so and making some 
gains in terms of relative influence in region have not in any real sense led to a 
diminishment of Russian influence. Indeed, the primacy of the EU’s relations 
with Russia in respect to Central Asia itself serves to act as a brake for a more 
comprehensive engagement with Kazakhstan in order to ensure the 
maintenance of friendly relations with Moscow. As such, the influence that the 
EU can bring to bear is quite strongly constrained.  
 
                                                 
89 MacFarlane, op. cit., p.149.  
90 European Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ‘EU Assistance to 
Kazakhstan,’ The European Commission, available at:  
<http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Ite
mid=72>. 
91 E. B. Rumer, ‘China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia’, Strategic Forum, No. 
223, 2006, available at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF223/SF223.pdf>, p. 6.  
92 Eurasianet.org, ‘Kazakhstan: Tenge may drop despite China’s $10 billion aid package’, 
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93 MacFarlane, op. cit., p.150.  
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Having traditionally been the ‘backyard’ of Russia with a significant Russian 
population as well as substantial integration into the infrastructure both 
Kazakhstan and Russia inherited from the USSR, Astana still maintains very 
close relations with Moscow. By virtue of this and the control that Moscow 
maintains over the transit of energy supplies, Russia has the potential to exert 
a great deal of influence over Kazakhstan if it desires. Despite the inroads that 
the EU has made into Kazakhstan particularly through the oil industry and 
development projects such as INOGATE, it has failed to foster a great deal of 
influence over Astana. Indeed, it appears that Astana may have potentially 
cultivated more influence over Brussels by virtue of its growing importance as 
an oil exporter and its ability to court EU governments and corporations 
without committing to substantive reforms. Entry into the Kazakh market by 
EU and US companies does provide some measure for influence however it is 
of much less significance than that enjoyed by the Russian government 
through the presence of its state-owned energy giants and the assets that they 
control. Indeed, without a more comprehensive strategy to ensure a greater 
share of market space by EU and US-based companies, diversification of 
holdings in the development process and an effective political aspect to EU-
Kazakh relations, it is unlikely that current EU engagement will lead to a 
marked diminishment of Russian influence in Kazakhstan. 
 
